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SHARED RESOURCES IN INDUSTRIAL DISTRICTS: INFORMATION, 
KNOW-HOW AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE SPANISH TILE INDUSTRY 
 
ABSTRACT: The aim of this paper is to measure the effect of shared resources on 
individual firm performance. Using the Industrial District as a definition of the 
interorganizational context, we propose a model that includes a set of factors that are 
associated with the endowment of external resources, that is, collective information and 
know-how, and involvement in local institutions. In order to illustrate the theoretical 
argumentation, we develop an empirical study using a one hundred-firm sample from 
the Spanish Ceramic Tile industry in order to search for a statistical association between 
resource variables and performance of the firms. Finally, findings of the paper suggest 
that in order to increase performance firms must develop a distinct capacity so as to be 
able to shape and exploit shared or collective resources. 
 
KEYWORDS: Industrial District, Shared Resources, Knowledge, Performance. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The amount of attention given to the concept of Industrial District has been growing 
steadily in recent times, probably due to the success observed in similar economic 
activities that are geographically concentrated. Industrial district research has provided 
empirical support in favor of performance superiority for localized firms (e.g. Signori, 
1994; Paniccia, 1999; Becchetti and Rossi, 2000). For the most part, these studies are 
focused on comparative analyses confronting firms from within industrial districts with 
those from outside them.  
 3
In contrast, this paper has tried to address a research issue that has still not been 
satisfactorily resolved. How can the differences in performance observed in firms inside 
an industrial district be accounted for? 
We have conceptualized agglomeration externalities as shared resources. These refer 
to the resources which a firm can access through being a member of a cluster (such as 
an industrial district). Shared resources are semi-public by definition; in other words, 
they are not exclusive to one individual firm but at the same time they are not available 
to external (non-member) firms. Thus, what happens in firms is that the sum of their 
resources can be classified according to whether they are generated internally or they 
are provided as a consequence of external relationships. However, firms vary 
significantly in terms of how effectively they use and benefit from shared resources, so 
the firm’s ability to shape and leverage shared or collective resources can be defined as 
a distinct capacity. 
In order to address the research question, we proposed and tested a model based on 
the resources shared by the firms in the district, which include a set of factors 
concerning information, know-how and involvement in institutions. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the first section, we offer an overview of the 
concept of industrial district, while in the second section we provide a theoretical 
framework linking recent firm strategy theories with regional analysis. In the third 
section, we review attempts to measure industrial district performance, and in the fourth 
we formulate hypotheses. Then, in order to illustrate our theoretical argumentation, we 
develop an empirical study using a sample of firms from the Spanish Ceramic Tile 
industry with the intention of finding a statistical association between resource variables 
(information, know-how and local institutions) and the performance of the firms. 
Finally, we discuss the implications of the research findings.  
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The extended relationships that develop under circumstances of physical proximity 
may vary considerably in their details, yet their underlying logic is constant. Industrial 
districts in south-western Germany or northern central Italy are based on a set of local 
circumstances, but the principles of mutual organization on which these districts are 
based are more widely applicable. Similar interfirm cooperation is often found in 
economic activities based in a particular region (e.g. Scandinavia) or in locales where 
firms from similar industries are spatially concentrated, such as Silicon Valley in the 
United States. In an introductory work, Pyke and Sengenberger (1992: 4) describe the 
main characteristics of industrial districts as the existence of strong networks of 
(chiefly) small firms. Through specialization and subcontracting, they share out 
amongst themselves the labor required for the manufacture of particular goods – 
specialization induces efficiency, and specialization combined with subcontracting 
promotes collective capability. Moreover, industrial districts promote trust and 
cooperation, which shows entrepreneurial dynamism and flexibility. In this paper, we 
use the term as defined by Becattini (1990: 39), namely, ‘A socio-geographical entity 
which is characterized by the active presence of both a community of people and a 
population of firms in one naturally and historically bounded area’. Thus, we may say 
that an industrial district is comprised of numerous small firms engaged in related 
activities and which are located in a clearly identifiable community. This togetherness 
implies a cultural homogeneity that gives rise to an atmosphere of cooperative and 
trusting behavior in which economic action is regulated by implicit and explicit rules 
(Lazerson and Lorenzoni, 1999). 
Marshallian, or agglomeration, economies were the first justification for the benefits 
that industrial districts offered firms. The author of the original concept of industrial 
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district, Marshall (1925), identified a class of external economies that focus on the 
benefits to be obtained by individual firms or plants from the increased pooling of 
common factors, which include skilled human resources, specialized suppliers and 
technological spillovers (Krugman, 1991). Likewise, the Marshallian concept of 
industrial atmosphere can be transferred to the existence of some intangible resources 
based on experience, knowledge and information that are common to district firms. 
Some authors now argue that geographical agglomerations benefit firms in the form 
of externalities or non-traded interdependencies (Storper and Scott, 1989; Storper, 
1992), while others emphasize the superiority of this form of industrial organization 
over mass production and vertically integrated companies (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Best, 
1990). As pointed out by Crewe (1996), Russo (1997), Paniccia (1998) or Harrison 
(1991), the most important implication of industrial districts goes beyond agglomeration 
economies and refers to the presence of a community of people. Through mutual 
knowledge and continual contracting and recontracting experience fosters relational 
trust (Harrison, 1991; Russo, 1997; Paniccia, 1998) and this relational trust in turn 
limits opportunism among partners in this communitarian industrial district market 
(Lorenz, 1992; Dei Ottati, 1994; Foss and Koch, 1996). Indeed, relational trust is 
fundamental in explaining the most important net result of this embedding – the 
paradoxical combination of cooperation and competition inside industrial districts 
(Harrison, 1991). 
 
Industrial districts and the individual firm 
In spite of the large number of studies and theoretical propositions in this field, little 
effort has been devoted to justifying the benefits for firms within these agglomerations 
in the light of recent research into firm strategy. We argue that the competitive factors 
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of industrial districts may be related to recent firm strategy research. This argument 
clearly coincides with a number of other studies, of which some of the more interesting 
include those by Foss (1996a), Lawson (1999) and Lawson and Lorenz (1999). 
In order to link the idea of the industrial district with firm strategy perspectives, we 
use the notion of shared resources, taken as referring to any resources shared by 
industrial district firms. They are neither exclusive to nor the property of the individual 
firm and they are not made available to outside firms. In addition, these shared 
resources may yield rents for industrial district firms. Shared resources are generally 
available in districts, although not all firms in the district benefit from externalities to 
the same extent. The condition of membership allows firms to access these resources, 
although there are a number of factors moderating the use of shared resources. 
We have tried to find similarities between the notion of shared resources and other 
existing concepts in the literature, our search focusing on higher order capabilities 
(Foss, 1996a) and advanced factors (Porter, 1990). Indeed Foss (1996b) recognized that 
Porter's 'diamond' framework captures some of the importance of higher-order 
capabilities, for instance, having access to efficient factor markets at relatively low 
transport costs or a pool of skilled labor, sharing in standardization, and so forth. 
Proximity, a sense of belonging and other factors are mentioned as being 
characteristic features of district membership. These factors facilitate a set of relational-
based ‘shared resources’. For analytical purposes, three different kinds of resources 
were distinguished: information, know-how and local institutions. We point out that 
information and knowledge-based resources are potentially strategic in the sense of 
providing firms with a higher competitive position. We collected informational 
advantages generated in both business and non-business relational networks, as well 
from relationships with local institutions. 
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Internal heterogeneity in the industrial districts 
While most of the literature was focused on the superiority of district firms in 
comparison with outsiders, a certain level of homogeneity inside district firms was 
implicitly assumed. This means that the knowledge resources and the channels they 
flow along are of a public or common nature for the members of the district. By being a 
member, i.e. belonging to the district, a firm is provided with a series of common 
infrastructures that it can use.  
The majority of studies in this field have been based on case studies. Most of them 
described success stories, both in terms of social welfare in the areas and in terms of the 
supremacy of localized firms. Yet, this phenomenon changes significantly from place to 
place or from area to area (Harrison, 1991). Although these case studies have illustrated 
the characteristics and the evolution of industrial districts (Amin and Robins, 1990; 
Staber, 1998), one of their limitations is the existence of factors that are specific to the 
case being studied. As Paniccia (1998) pointed out, these studies are limited by the 
researcher’s selection of a particular case. In fact, together with success stories, we also 
find other studies that question the validity and potential of the model (Bianchi, 1994; 
Harrison, 1994) or its vulnerability, as may be the case, for instance, in responding to 
radical external technological changes (Glasmeier, 1991). Some examples evidence the 
persistence of opportunism within the district, the super-exploitation of minority groups, 
and the persistence of groups of dominant firms that benefit from the asymmetries of 
demand and information (DeBresson and Amesse, 1991). 
In the field of European industrial districts and more particularly in the Italian case, 
Paniccia (1998, 1999) conducted a comparative study of a number of Italian industrial 
districts. Using macroeconomic and social variables of performance to perform her 
analysis, she found evidence of performance superiority in industrial district firms. 
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Signori (1994) compared the financial performance of auxiliary companies in the 
province of Prato by comparing firms within and from outside the district. In similar 
terms, Molina (2001) carried out a comparative study for the Spanish ceramic tile 
district. Finally, Becchetti and Rossi (2000) have shown the positive effect of the 
industrial district on export performance for the Italian case. 
All this research has provided empirical support in favor of performance superiority 
for localized agglomerations of firms. However, these studies considered the industrial 
district as a whole, and thus assumed high internal homogeneity. However, in reality 
this idea of homogeneity is not fully confirmed. A more thorough examination of 
districts shows that they are not populated by homogeneous communities of 
entrepreneurs and technicians sharing both technical know-how and generic 
information. In fact, on some occasions, even different firm structures can arise 
(Rabellotti and Schmitz, 1999). Because firms develop their own networks of social 
relationships, as a result what they offer is also different. According to McEvily and 
Zaheer (1999) firms embed themselves among the rest of the actors in the network in 
widely differing manners and they therefore present specific and distinctive 
opportunities and restrictions. Firms inside the district show significant differences, for 
instance, when it comes to exploiting common or shared resources or externalities 
(Molina and Martínez, 2004). In this vein, Morrison and Rabellotti (2005) have 
characterised two types of internal networks. Rather than a unitary, homogeneous vision 
of the district, these authors distinguish between what we could label dense networks 
and dispersed networks. On the one hand, there is the hard nucleus of the network (core 
network), where the component firms benefit from intensive flows of knowledge and 
information among firms. And, on the other hand, we have the periphery network, 
where more distant relationships occur. 
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We define them as shared resources because of their semi-public nature, since 
membership to the district provides a set of infrastructures – and even a set of 
relationships – which can be used economically by firms. Another issue refers to the 
utilization, use or exploitation of these resources. This depends not only on the nature or 
structure of the individual resource (suitable for combination or scale but also on 
individual firm strategy in order to create and adapt the endowment of resources. This 
means accumulation and flows of resources. Consequently, what we have tested is the 
utilization or exploitation of collective or shared resources.  
Nooteboom (1999) claims that enterprises with knowledge bases that are too similar 
or, conversely, too different are of little use to the focal enterprise. The transmission of 
knowledge will take place more efficiently among actors that possess knowledge bases 
that are only relatively close to each other. This requirement concerning the degree of 
similarity can be considered to be an effect that moderates the ease with which 
resources are disseminated within the network. This argument is useful to understand 
one of the main points of our research. Although in districts there are a number of 
shared or common resources not all the firms have the same ability to exploit them.  
 
Social Capital as a shared resource 
Gordon and McCann (2000) have developed the social network model. In this model, 
social networks of certain strong interpersonal relationships can transcend firm 
boundaries and this results in many interfirm social interactions perhaps being stronger 
than their intrafirm relations. These interpersonal relationships depend on interpersonal 
trust and informal relationships. In fact, informality is viewed as being a potential 
strength rather than a weakness in its role as a control mechanism. The strength of these 
relationships is described in terms of the embeddedness of the social network 
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(Granovetter, 1985). Social networks are a form of durable social capital which is 
created and sustained through a combination of social history and collective action. 
Their strength is a problematic issue, since it depends on a number of conditions such as 
a prior accumulation of trust, circumstances facilitating the monitoring of the behavior 
of others, a source of leadership and a sense of common interest, as well as the 
expectation of significant gain. Access to the ‘club’ will depend on past experience and 
routine interaction as well as on investment of effort in developing personal relations 
and trust. These factors may favor the development and reproduction of location-
specific networks, in which case co-location will be a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for access. In a more general sense, it reinforces the importance of both direct 
and indirect weak ties (Granovetter, 1973) and more pluralistic and open-ended 
network-building strategies in which actors develop more extensive groups of links 
(particularly with better connected actors) that prove to be more useful than being 
committed to any single actor. 
External relationships enable firms to obtain and combine knowledge-based 
resources from exchange partners. Through social interaction firms may increase the 
depth, breadth and efficiency of the mutual exchange of knowledge (Lane and Lubatkin, 
1998). The external network of a firm can be considered to be a strategic resource in 
itself. Since networks are built by relying on a path-dependent course, they are 
idiosyncratic and difficult to imitate. As a result, accessible resources from the networks 
are also relatively inimitable and non-substitutable. Thus, networks can be considered to 
be strategic resources that exert an influence on the future capability of the firm and 
they are therefore explanatory factors of the variations in firms’ performance 
(Andersson et al., 2002). 
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Consequently, a comprehensive view of strategic resources should include not only 
factors such as brands, technological capabilities or other similar factors, but it should 
also take into account the network resources or social capital of the firms (Gulati et al., 
2000). In our opinion the social capital perspective is a suitable perspective to explain 
why firms vary in their capacity to exploit shared resources, since firms vary in their 
particular interorganizational networks and these determine access to and use of 
knowledge and informational resources. On the other hand, Leenders and Gabbay’s 
(1999) main arguments concern, first, the multilevel application of the concept of social 
capital and, second, the distinction between social capital and social liability as positive 
and negative effects, respectively, of relationships on the attainment of goals. 
According to Cooke et al. (2005), social capital affects firms’ performance. In 
particular SMEs are studied by extending the analysis to the individual firm and 
regional levels. Findings supported the positive effect of social capital at the individual 
level but they were not so conclusive at a regional level. On the other hand, in Cooke 
and Clifton (2002), the key question is whether firms that make use of 'social capital' 
display a different business performance to those that do not, cet. par. Analysis showed 
evidence of a higher use of social capital by innovative SMEs. Regional variations in 
social capital use are also explored, the conclusion being that different types of social 
capital do indeed influence economic performance.  
Firm actions and outcomes are influenced by the pattern of relationships maintained 
with other firms and institutions. Specifically, the social capital perspective emphasized 
that networks of social relations penetrate irregularly and in differing degrees 
(Granovetter, 1985). Since each firm develops its own networks of relationships, firms’ 
social networks vary and consequently they lead to different outcomes. According to 
McEvily and Zaheer (1999), firms are embedded in highly differentiated ways that link 
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them to different sets of players and thereby present them with sharply distinct 
opportunities and constraints. In other words, firms vary in terms of their differential to 
discover and exploit competitive capabilities through their networks.  
For example, it is said that a dense network structure is suitable for the creation of 
common norms and values by firms, and then they present easy tacit knowledge 
transmission and exploiting opportunities. On the other hand, a disperse structure of 
relationships seems to be best suited to capturing new and exclusive opportunities and 
exploring activities. 
We aim to examine the effect of these shared resources on firm performance, 
assuming that firms vary in their ability to exploit these collective resources. Hence, we 
define three different types of shared resources: shared information, shared know-how 
and involvement in local institutions. The expected relationship between these shared 
resources and firm performance is the basis of our hypotheses, which we formulate as 
follows below. 
 
3. HYPOTHESES 
Shared information and firm performance. At an individual level, product and 
market information, databases, etc. constitute a relevant intangible resource (Hall, 1992, 
1993). Information as explicit knowledge is considered to be a generator of new 
knowledge and innovation for the firm (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). In districts, dense 
and strong tied district networks provide participants with fine-grained, high quality 
information exchanges. In addition, the industrial district provides norms and shared 
values for participants, thus facilitating cooperative behavior (Uzzi, 1997). 
Inside the industrial district there is a great amount of information available for firm 
members, referring basically to aspects concerning markets and products. Although 
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information is accessible for all district members, firms vary in terms of their ability or 
capacity to exploit them. This depends, for example, on the human or technological 
resources invested for this purpose or on how well characteristic organizational features 
fit the district environment. Firms may also vary in the way they use this information, in 
terms of interest or strategic priority, since firms are likely to maintain several different 
external networks (outside the district) as sources of information. Information here 
means data about products, processes and services, specific information about 
procedures, technical descriptions and so on. A dense structure of ties provides 
information about products and processes, technologies and innovations and also about 
markets. The external sources are the network of customers, suppliers and competitors.  
The extent to which district firms access and share collective resources in the form of 
information can affect how much they take advantage of these resources and improve 
their competitive capacity. Consequently, we link the existence of shared information 
and firm performance as the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: Firms that share and access more information that is commonly 
available in the district will have a higher firm performance.  
 
Shared know-how and firm performance. We understand shared know-how to be 
the common tacit, uncodified knowledge in the district that goes beyond collective 
information and data. This knowledge is based on common experience and intensive 
social relationships among managers and employees. Know-how is about specific tacit 
knowledge that flows inside a district. Basically human resources mobility was the 
mechanism by which this knowledge spread. Managers and technicians, as well as 
employees in general, frequently move from one firm to another (within the district); 
employees share the same local origin, which facilitates the use of a common language 
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and understanding; and they also have a common academic background and training. 
Note that this knowledge basically depends on the particularities of the industry or 
district. 
The literature on industrial districts frequently emphasizes the existence of 
knowledge shared by all district firms (Maskell, 2001). This shared resource produces, 
for example, district-specific technologies, that is, technologies which are not exclusive 
to one individual firm but which are unavailable to firms outside the district (Pinch and 
Henry, 1999). 
A number of authors also discuss several mechanisms of knowledge transmission, 
including high internal mobility of employees, previous job experience in the 
employees’ district and the creation of new firms by former employees. 
In our opinion, internal (district) human resources mobility is a key factor in 
embedded relations among people and firms. As Uzzi (1996, 1997) suggested, 
embedded ties entail problem-solving mechanisms that enable actors to coordinate 
functions and to work out problems ‘on the fly’. In embedded relationships, increased 
feedback, learning and new combinations allow problems to be solved more efficiently. 
These relationships also improve firm responses by reducing production errors. They 
replace the simplistic response of the market and enrich the network, because working 
through problems promotes learning and innovation (Uzzi, 1997). 
Capello and Faggian (2004) stated that in the regional approach the channels through 
which the relational capital (embedded relations) becomes collective learning are 
clearly defined as a high mobility of the local labor force, among others. During work, 
employees gather a lot of experience. If they leave a firm, they take this tacit knowledge 
with them and enrich the labor market (Tomlinson, 1999). For knowledge flows to 
successfully take place across firms’ boundaries, both a certain degree of human 
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resource immobility with respect to the external boundaries of the district and a certain 
degree of internal district mobility are required (Brenner, 2000). 
Of course, their tacit knowledge is related to their previous job, which often implies 
that the use of this knowledge is restricted to one industry or even a particular 
technology. It might be useful to other firms only up to a certain extent. However, many 
firms rely on this kind of human capital (Bramanti and Senn, 1990). Moreover, 
knowledge spillover that has a strong influence on the innovativeness of firms can be at 
least partially accounted for by the flows of workforce between firms, as well as by 
informal contacts between employees. Managers, technicians and employees frequently 
move from one firm to another but always within the district (Costa, 1993; Molina, 
2001). The local labor market is highly competitive since the availability of information 
and knowledge and technology is governed by similar demands. However, labor 
mobility respects the district boundaries, since the use of specific knowledge loses its 
value outside the district. 
In addition, new firms are mainly created by managers and employees from a parent 
firm and are normally located in the areas where the founders have lived and worked 
(Bramanti and Senn, 1990). As Johannisson and Monsted (1997) pointed out, 
intersectoral trust and informal social capital are accumulated in districts due to the 
close interconnections between business and community, thus creating an incubative 
arena for entrepreneurial activity. The founders of the new firms had accumulated a 
great deal of experience and specific knowledge from their previous jobs, and this 
context-specific knowledge has to do with the products and technologies present in the 
district. 
The degree to which district firms access this collective know-how influences how 
much they benefit from these resources and improve their competitive capacity. 
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Consequently, we link the existence of shared know-how and firm performance as the 
following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: Firms that share and access more know-how available in the district 
will have a higher firm performance. 
 
Involvement in local institutions and firm performance. Local institutions 
constitute another source of knowledge flows that has been extensively discussed in the 
literature. In fact, the role played by local institutions has been underlined as a critical 
factor for the development of industrial districts because they offer what Brusco (1990) 
defined as real services. The munificence of the geographic environment is manifested 
not just in terms of available pools of knowledgeable workers, but also in the form of 
access to local university researchers or university research projects. In fact, as 
frequently mentioned by a number of authors (e.g. Enright, 1998; Decarolis and Deeds, 
1999), in industrial districts the information provided by institutions such as trade 
associations and professional associations flows through diverse mechanisms such as 
the network of formal and informal relationships among managers and employees. 
Scott (1994, 1996) pointed out how industries in regions may vary in their dynamic 
character. Safety and trust alone do not necessarily guarantee competitive success. 
Unlike producers in Los Angeles, producers in Bangkok have been extremely effective 
in securing forceful political expression of their needs and goals. 
For the purposes of this research, we have defined local institutions as locally-
oriented organizations (both public and private) that provide a host of collective support 
services to firms in the district/region (Brusco, 1990). Examples of local institutions 
include technical assistance centers, universities, vocational training centers, local 
research institutes, industrial policy agents, and trade and professional associations. In 
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addition, we also provided respondents with a list of institutions to help them when 
answering the questions. 
Beyond providing district firms with specific support services and other resource 
benefits, local institutions act as repositories for knowledge and opportunities for firms. 
Because local institutions interact with a relatively large number of firms in the 
industrial district, they are exposed to a wide variety of solutions to the organizational 
challenges typically faced by firms in the district. In fact, local institutions facilitate 
managerial innovation by providing access to information and resources for acquiring 
new capabilities and extending already existing ones. Local institutions also mitigate the 
costs associated with locating the external sources of knowledge and specialized 
expertise that are critical to the acquisition of competitive capabilities (McEvily and 
Zaheer, 1999). 
Firms can access a greater number or amount of resources. Resources can be 
informational resources (data and reports on markets), human resources (people, 
technical assistance, consultancy), technological support by means of joint projects, 
machinery or specific facilities, etc. As we have pointed out above, a firm’s behavior 
may vary significantly with respect to the local institutions within the district. We find 
that this dimension has two poles: firms that only sporadically use some information or 
data about markets or technologies, yet with no commitment or formal relationship with 
institutions, and, at the other end of the spectrum, firms that participate in the creation or 
the management of the institutions, investing as active partners in joint projects, and so 
on.  
We use different indicators to find out the degree of involvement of firms in local 
institutions (e.g., trade association membership) and the participation of firms’ 
members, executives, technicians, and so on, therein. This may be, for instance, 
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appointments of company CEOs to leading positions in trade associations or the number 
of employees belonging to professional associations, the number of contracts or joint 
projects with research centres, and so on.  
Firms in the district vary in the extent to which they use or exploit opportunities that 
local institutions can provide. Apart from the discussion on the reasons behind variation 
in using institutions, what we have tried to capture is whether a firm lies closer to the 
situation expressed by a statement like “we only occasionally receive information from 
local institutions” or instead they feel closer to the idea that “our firm is an active 
partner in joint projects to be developed with institutions”. Consequently, we 
hypothesized that the extent to which the firm is involved with local institutions affects 
its creation of value. 
Local institutions play the role of an intermediary and, as such, they facilitate the 
accumulation and diffusion of knowledge, thus reducing search costs. We can formulate 
the hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 3: Firms with a greater degree of involvement with local institutions will 
have a higher performance. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL STUDY 
Our empirical study was based on the population of firms that make up the Spanish 
ceramic tile industrial district. A preliminary question to be investigated is whether the 
Spanish ceramic tile cluster can be considered to be an industrial district. Indeed, a 
number of authors have previously identified this area as an industrial district (Utili et 
al., 1983; Castillo, 1989; Benton, 1990; Ybarra, 1991; Nomisma, 1992; Costa, 1993), 
one noteworthy example is that of Ybarra (1991), who used Sforzi’s method based on 
the above-average density of specialized SMEs in a bounded geographical area. 
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Sources. The selection of firms was collected from The Tile Guide (2003) and 
Listing Companies (2003). The sample was checked against the listing from the 
ARDAN database. These databases allowed us to identify the address of the firms and 
the four-digit code of the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). The initial list of 
ceramic firms contained 149 companies. Most data (performance and control variables) 
were collected from the Trade Registry Office (Registros Mercantiles) for the period 
from 1997 to 2002. Additional descriptive data were collected from the annual report 
published by ASCER (2003) (the Spanish trade association of ceramic tile 
manufacturers). 
A questionnaire was developed and run in the Spanish industrial district. In this 
district there are diverse related activities included in the same productive process. To 
identify a homogeneous group of firms enabling us to run the empirical analysis we 
chose the final firms, which are those that carry out the final phases of the production 
process of the ceramic tile and which are in contact with external markets. Their 
denomination as ‘final firms’ has been borrowed from Brusco (1992), who classified 
firms in a district into three different categories, namely final, specialized and integrated 
firms, depending on their position in the production process. Hence, the questionnaire 
was administered face-to-face to managers from the final firms in the district. 
The total number of respondents was 100 from a population of 149 firms. With 
regard to non-respondent firm bias, there were no significant differences in terms of size 
and technological attributes. Item selection was also based on the feedback obtained 
from a pilot questionnaire. For the sake of simplicity, we employed a five-point Likert 
scale, where a score of 5 means ‘I strongly agree’ and a score of 1 means ‘I strongly 
disagree’ with indicators of the different selected variables. 
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Variables 
We agree in considering sources that are outside the district as a potential 
competitive advantage. However, in our research we attempted to capture these external 
relations indirectly through local institutions as intermediary agents. Rather than 
measuring direct links of the firms with external networks, we prefer local institutions, 
since in this way we measure a more ‘homogeneous’ variety of links and also this 
measurement can be obtained more easily. Furthermore, firms in districts are faced with 
a number of barriers hindering them from connecting directly with external networks. 
Asking directly about external networks can be difficult to express and may make it 
hard for respondents to understand what we are really trying to measure. This may be 
due to the fact that there are so many different, heterogeneous external networks.  
We have assumed that firms in districts have to overcome significant barriers in 
order to gain direct access to external networks so that they can be provided with 
resources. Findings from the case studies suggested several explanations for the barriers 
that prevent firms from gaining direct access to external networks. 
First, as we have said, one primary reason preventing direct access to external 
networks is the small size of the firms in districts. Indeed, in most cases these firms do 
not have significant R&D and marketing departments. Thus, they cannot afford to make 
the large financial investments required by research projects or marketing campaigns. 
By definition, one of the characteristic features of the industrial district is the small size 
of these specialized firms.  
The second reason concerns the need for an intensive exchange and combination of 
resources in the innovation process and, consequently, an important interfirm 
coordination effort is also required. In the industrial district there is a high degree of 
specialization and, hence, knowledge and innovation involve efforts by other groups of 
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firms. Local institutions may act as coordinators of this process. They play the role of a 
third party in coordinating activities among different firms within the district.  
Finally, the high transaction cost of knowledge transfer in the open external markets 
is also observed. The barriers can be justified since searching for new opportunities to 
improve the innovation capabilities of firms implies high levels of uncertainty and risk. 
Firms can avoid risks by using local institutions to provide a feasible source of 
information about the existing options.  
The shared information (INFORMATION) variable attempted to capture the 
existence of collective information in the district. This shared information is provided 
by diverse entities. We asked managers to assess the importance of this information in 
the endowment of resources of the individual firm. We defined this variable using the 
items described in Exhibit I. 
The shared know-how (KNOW-HOW) variable attempted to go beyond the scientific 
and codified knowledge and data. Its purpose was to capture the existence and the 
importance of the flows of collective learning that take place because of exchanges of 
the tacit knowledge that stems from the common experience among the firms in the 
district. We defined this variable using the items described in Exhibit I. 
The involvement in the local institutions (INSTITUTIONS) variable attempted to 
capture the role played by the local institutions in the exchanges of information and 
knowledge. We defined this variable using the items described in Exhibit I. 
 
Control variables. As suggested in many previous works in our field (e.g. Grant et 
al., 1988), we also controlled for other variables that were likely to affect performance, 
including firm Size and Age (Exhibit I). The size variable (SIZE) allows us to control 
for economies and diseconomies of scale at the firm level (Hitt et al., 1997). Age (AGE) 
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was also included, since some authors have suggested that in industrial districts 
temporary evolution affects performance (Glasmeier, 1991; Pouder and St. John, 1996). 
 
Organizational performance variables. The selection of the proper indicator with 
which to measure organizational performance is a question that has been discussed at 
length although no common agreement has yet been reached among authors. In our 
case, the difficulty involved in finding the most suitable indicator increased because we 
sought to assess the effect of a firm’s membership to an interorganizational network. 
Consequently, in order to reinforce the measurement of performance we used a 
two-dimensional measure (Tallman and Li, 1996). On the one hand, we used a 
subjective measure based on the degree of firm satisfaction while, on the other, we 
employed an objective measure based on two indicators, namely, return on assets and 
growth of the firm. 
In the strategic alliance and interorganizational networks, many authors argue in 
favor of subjective measures of organizational performance (e.g. Inkpen and 
Birkenshaw, 1994). In our case, we defined a subjective performance variable 
(SATISFACTION) to assess the degree to which the firms are satisfied with the 
advantages associated with industrial district membership. We defined this variable 
using five different items, the result being a final indicator obtained by simple 
computation (Exhibit I). To solve the potential construct validity problem we controlled 
with Cronbach’s Alpha, in accordance with Table 1. 
Two different indicators were used to measure performance: return on assets and 
growth (Exhibit I). Accounting-based measures of a firm’s profitability have received 
criticism from some authors (e.g. Aaker and Jacobson, 1987), but their use has been 
justified by others (Hoskisson et al., 1993; Robins and Wiersema, 1995). In fact, many 
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studies focused on homogeneous firms have used ROA as a measure of firm 
performance (e.g. Grant, 1987; Robins and Wiersema, 1995; Hitt et al., 1997). This 
indicator allows us to isolate the assessment of the quality of firm management since it 
is not affected by financial interests and costs. With respect to ROA, data were collected 
for the three first years from the Trade Registry Office. The last three years of the 
period considered were completed from the ARDAN database (ARDAN, 2002, 2003, 
2004). 
The second objective indicator was the growth of the firm (GROWTH), which 
provides a measure of operating performance to complement measurements of 
accounting performance (Geringer et al., 2000). The ROA and GROWTH variables 
were used to calculate the average value for the period under consideration. We 
contrasted the responses with available objective data and then we considered any cases 
that presented significant differences to be missing values. 
 
Analysis techniques 
First, to find construct validity, Cronbach’s Alpha was calculated for each variable, 
as measured by multi-item scales to indicate adequate reliability and internal 
consistency (Nunnally, 1978). The discriminant validity was calculated for all pairs of 
variables by examining the matrix of correlations. 
Second, models of conditioned probability, such as Logit, allow us to consider the 
interactions between different variables or factors explaining the firms’ behavior. So, 
this analysis by means of Logit regression can be used to model the impact of the 
explanatory variables on the performance measured by SATISFACTION and 
GROWTH as discrete variables. 
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The model can be defined as follows: 
Pi = E(y=1|xi) = 1 / (1+ e –z) 
Z= α + β1 Size + β2 Age + β3 Information + β4 Know-How + β5 Institutions + ε 
         (+/-)    (-)            (+)     (+)        (+) 
 
Where the dependent variable y takes values [1-5], α is the intercept term, and βi 
(i=1-5) is the coefficient of the explanatory variable I; finally, the expected sign appears 
in brackets. Note that in building the model, economic coherency has been a priority 
rather than other considerations (e.g. pursuing maximization of correct cases in the 
classification). Above all we aim to obtain indicators explaining firms’ outcomes. 
The linear regression model (OLS) was run with the ROA performance measures 
used as the dependent continuous variable. All regression models included control 
variables. 
 
Results 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
Table 1 includes descriptive statistics, Cronbach’s Alpha for the multi-item variables 
and Pearson’s correlations for all pairs of variables. As expected, the results show that 
the explanatory variables are correlated, although the control variables were not. On the 
one hand, the dependent variables ROA and SATISFACTION were correlated, but this 
was not the case with GROWTH. This means that SATISFACTION, as a measure of 
subjective performance, is related to ROA but not to GROWTH. 
From the Pearson correlation matrix we know that INFORMATION, KNOW-HOW 
and INSTITUTIONS are correlated. From a statistical point of view this presents some 
limitations since these indicators may be a measure of the same construct and, 
consequently, adding more explanatory variables does not provide a better explanation 
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of the dependent variable. However, as we understand it, theoretically it is important to 
control all three variables. It can be expected that firms that enjoy more collective 
information are, at the same time, those which receive more knowledge (for instance via 
internal mobility) and also use more services offered by the local institutions. 
The full explanation of the benefits of the systemic effects probably comes from the 
perspective of individual firm capabilities. The distinct capabilities of the firm may be 
based on specific resources for exploiting the local environment or on fitting 
characteristic organizational features to the district environment. These capabilities 
allow synergies to be obtained from the use of different shared resources. In any case, 
no reason can be found to believe that the use of one particular collective resource 
limits or restrains the use of the others.  
Finally, in order to investigate a possible problem of collinearity, we used the 
tolerance test of the statistic VIF (Variance Inflation Factor). This is the reciprocate 
value of the tolerance. The result of this test indicated that the least favorable value of 
this statistic was 1.212. We considered this value as being close enough to 1 to be 
considered a satisfactory test of tolerance. 
Regarding the α value, the least favorable value belongs to the multi-item scale of 
the KNOW-HOW variable. This value was at the lower limit of tolerance (0.6), yet, 
bearing in mind the nature of the study, we considered the feasibility of the scales used 
as being satisfactory tested (Nunnally, 1978; Malhotra, 1997). 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Table 2 shows the results of this Logit estimated model for each of the dependent 
variables. The X2 test (29.958 and 27.486, respectively) accepts the alternative 
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hypothesis that all parameters of the model are simultaneously different from zero, 
significantly at 1%. All coefficients have the expected sign, with the exception of the 
KNOW-HOW variable. The Wald Statistic shows that the INFORMATION and 
INSTITUTIONS variables are significant, whereas the rest of the variables are not. 
Consequently, estimations of the multivariate model reveal the explanatory capacity of 
the proposed variables for firms’ performance. 
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
Table 3 shows the proposed OLS regression model. The results allow the following 
common conclusions to be drawn.  
INFORMATION and INSTITUTIONS were significant at levels p<0.10 and p<0.01, 
respectively. We agree that the R2 value in the case of ROA was not particularly high. 
However, considering the complexity of the dependent variable (cause by many non-
hypothesized factors) we find the explanatory capacity of our variable high enough 
Moreover, levels of significant are acceptable, both individually, and particularly 
globally. 
Regarding the results of both analysis techniques, the following considerations must 
be mentioned. On the one hand, the model possesses a higher explanatory capacity for 
subjective performance measures than for objective one, while on the other hand the 
KNOW-HOW variable appeared as the only non-significant value for the regression 
models. At first sight, we found no satisfactory explanation for this fact and linked it 
with the results in Table 1, where the α value for this variable was the least favorable. 
This fact and the results for this variable indicated the need to improve the selection of 
items for measuring the variable. In order to control the effect of the KNOW-HOW 
variable with more precision we ran an alternative analysis considering the components 
 27
of the variable. This new analysis consisted in breaking the variable up into two 
different variables, one based on the indicators related to previous experience gained 
from a district job, local origin and common background, and the other based on 
internal mobility. Results confirmed a non-significant effect of these variables. 
In any case, as direct interpretation of the results of the regression model indicates, 
the impact of explicit or codified knowledge on the SATISFACTION and ROA of the 
firms is lower than that exerted by the involvement in local institutions. In contrast, 
explicit knowledge has an important impact on the GROWTH of the firms. 
Models attempt to observe the degree to which the three performance measures are 
accounted for by the control variables, and are hence exogenous to our model. Results 
show that these variables do not significantly explain the different performance. 
Regarding SIZE, this conclusion is consistent with other previous works in the field of 
industrial districts. In the industrial district, economies of scale do not play a decisive 
role as occurs in other interorganizational contexts. The industrial district literature used 
to argue that collaboration agreements, the existence of local institutions supporting 
R&D activities and highly specialized suppliers reduce the effect of the economies of 
scale. The same conclusions can be found in Russo (1985), who suggested that 
economies of scale played a secondary role in the development of the Italian ceramic 
industrial district. 
Regarding AGE, some authors (e.g. Pouder and St. John, 1996) suggested that as a 
result of public and private incentives to the creation of new clusters and certain 
characteristics of their evolution, AGE is negatively related to firm performance. Along 
the same lines, Glasmeier (1991) pointed out that production systems and 
innovativeness are time dependent in industrial districts. In spite of these suggestions, at 
least in our case, this hypothesis cannot be confirmed, since AGE was not significantly 
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related to any performance variable. An explanation can be found in the fact that the 
ceramic district is now in a mature phase of its development where even the new firms 
enjoy similar conditions with respect to already existing firms. 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The primary research question investigated in this paper has been to analyze the 
factors affecting a firm’s performance in the context of territorial agglomerations such 
as Industrial Districts. Throughout the theoretical discussion, we have argued that it may 
be useful to extend recent contributions to firm strategy perspectives in order to include 
the industrial district level. This aim coincides with previous works, particularly those 
by Foss (1996a), Lawson (1999) and Lawson and Lorenz (1999). However, we found 
no satisfactory answers in previous research, since authors have shifted their attention 
between two different levels of factors, i.e. individual and aggregated levels, without 
considering an integrated view. 
The tradition of the Resource-Based View (Barney, 1986, 1991) focused on the 
individual firm as a unit of analysis, considering firms’ heterogeneity to be one of their 
basic principles. From this point of view, there is no a clear explanation of how firms in 
industrial districts display better performance than non-members, even within the same 
industry and country, as some research has proved (Molina, 2001). It is clear that some 
kind of systemic or collective effect benefits these firms. 
In contrast, in the Industrial District tradition, most authors have considered the 
district as a whole, analyzing only aggregate data and results. According to the 
literature, the geographically ‘bounded’ agglomerations may yield a number of 
beneficial non-traded interdependencies. These interdependencies are significant factors 
in explaining why some geographically bounded entities may prosper or lag behind 
other entities. This perspective does not take into account the fact that firms may present 
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significant internal (i.e. within the district) differences in terms of characteristic features 
and performance. As McEvily and Zaheer (1999) pointed out, individual units vary in 
form and the exploitation of collective goods.  
We suggest that strategic resources (those which are involved in the competitive 
advantage of the firms) can be classified for analytical purposes on two different levels: 
one on a systemic or district level and the other on an individual firm level. 
Accordingly, the variation in firm performance can be explained not only by individual 
resources but also by shared resources inside districts. In the industrial district, there are 
shared resources which are neither exclusive to nor the property of the individual firm 
and they are unavailable to external firms. 
In order to isolate the effect of the industrial district on performance of the firms, we 
have presented a set of factors that comprise the shared resources in industrial districts. 
We have proposed and tested a model of shared resources, including factors related to 
information, tacit knowledge and support by local institutions. 
The empirical section has explored the explanatory relationships of the industrial 
district on firm performance. Although we have focused on shared resources, this means 
that wholly internal factors do not affect firm performance. We have analytically 
separated both levels, i.e. individual and collective, as we understand them to be closely 
interrelated. The results of our work suggested that firms operating in contexts with 
strong interconnections with other organizations must develop what we can define as a 
distinct capacity focused on the shaping and leverage of shared or collective resources. 
Consequently, we agree with Lam’s (2000) suggestion to move away from the 
traditional professional model of the relationship between firm and local institutions and 
to draw closer to a more interactive model. The growing importance of cross-
disciplinary knowledge and the new dynamics in the formation of codified knowledge 
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call for a reassessment of institutional arrangements. Firms should develop close links 
with local institutions. Social networks facilitate the rapid transmission of evolving 
codified knowledge. 
Before discussing possible contributions of this paper, mention must be made of 
some of its limitations. Because of the nature of the district membership variable, we are 
cautious about inferring any degree of causality among the key constructs. Although we 
have presented hypotheses in a manner that implies certain independence among 
variables, it is possible that district membership explains other variables. Consequently, 
further research is needed to elaborate the relationship between the different elements of 
the model. Another question may be raised as to the diversity of the local institutions. 
Since local institutions may be predominately from the same industry, the information 
accessed by local firms may be less diverse. Thus, a deeper analysis is needed of how 
local institutions vary in terms of the scope of the activities they carry out. A final 
challenge we confronted was that of operationalizing the dimensions of the shared 
resources in the territorial context. Their definitions must, therefore, be tentative and 
future research is needed to confirm them. In the same way, the choice of small 
manufacturing firms as the focus of this study limits the extent to which the findings can 
be generalized. An argument worth exploring, and which may help to explain 
performance differences among firms in industrial districts (not differences in access, 
but rather differences in utilization), is that even with access to the same resources, 
firms may benefit differently from the resources because of extra advantages of 
combining external resources with some of their internal resources or some firms may 
have some similar resources already, hence enjoying scale economies (Dierickx and 
Cool, 1989). 
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The main contribution of our paper is to isolate the effect of the interfirm (inter-
organization) relationships on firm performance in industrial districts. We consider that 
the ability to exploit externalities is a part of the capabilities of the firm, and this is 
particularly important in the case of district members. The firm strategy perspective 
(resource-based view) can help us to gain a better understanding of the nature and 
characteristics of the externalities, since they may accomplish Barney's conditions of 
rarity, economic value and difficulty to be copied and substituted. 
By emphasizing the role played by local institutions, this paper is in line with those 
which alert against over-embeddedness in relationships (Yli-Renko et al., 2001) and 
encourage autonomous relationships (Woolcock, 1998). According to Uzzi (1996, 1997) 
and Burt (1992), over-embeddedness could be produced when all the firms in a network 
are connected through embedded ties. This can reduce the flow of new or novel 
information into the network because of redundant ties. This means that there are few or 
no links to outside members who can potentially contribute innovative ideas. In our 
approach we do not analyze the decrease in benefits at a certain level of embedded 
relationships. We considered that firms can manage with a portfolio of diverse types of 
ties and can thus compensate or moderate this possible negative effect. Each type of ties 
(weak and strong ones) serves a different strategic purpose (Rowley et al., 2000). In 
particular, as some previous research has suggested, local institutions may play an 
intermediary role between external (under-embedded) networks, or structural holes, and 
internal, over-embedded, networks (Molina et al., 2002). Through a portfolio of ties or 
intermediary agents, both approaches argue mechanisms to moderate the negative 
effects of over-embeddedness on providing the flow of new or novel information. This 
combination of ties prevents us from considering the industrial district as a limited 
model, in contrast to the arguments of some authors (Bianchi, 1994; Harrison, 1994), 
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and offers the possibility of escaping from certain risks, such as external technological 
shocks (Glasmeier, 1991). 
Our proposition supported a number of prescriptions for firms' strategies. We argue 
that firms should interact with local institutions and other cluster participants in order to 
improve environmental conditions. Dynamics between the formation of tacit and 
codified knowledge and other elements of the innovation processes call for a 
reassessment of institutional arrangements. Firms may pursue diverse strategies for 
knowledge and skills resourcing, including, among others, strategic partnerships with 
key institutions to influence the education and training of future researchers; research 
collaboration with individual academics or departments in universities in order to gain 
early access to research; or, finally, the creation of hybrid research organizations 
between firms and institutions to develop common research programs. 
Finally, our research has raised a number of further questions. The fine-grained process 
through which network structure is created or modified is an interesting and important 
area for future research. Further research is needed to elaborate the relationship between 
the different elements of the model and to confirm the definitions and scales used in the 
constructs. Another fruitful area of inquiry is the dynamics of how firms' networks 
evolve and change in response to external challenges and opportunities. In other words, 
to what extent does inertia constrain a firm's ability to reconfigure its pattern of network 
ties? In particular, we intend to investigate the effects of social capital structure (dense 
or disperse) and the nature of the ties (strong or weak) and study their effects on firms' 
capacity to exploit common resources in the district and, ultimately, to develop 
innovative capacity. 
On the other hand, the processes of cooperative competition in geographical clusters 
could benefit greatly from a more detailed analysis of the mix of cooperation and 
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competition in networks. The balance between interfirm cooperation and competition, 
while a popular idea, warrants greater research attention, particularly in the network 
context. 
In fact, we believe that externalities are not statically given in the environment but, 
on the contrary, firms can improve these conditions through active interaction with local 
conditions, government and other firms. Firms should interact with local institutions and 
other district participants in order to improve environmental conditions. Dynamics 
between the formation of tacit and codified knowledge and other elements of innovation 
processes call for a reassessment of institutional arrangements. Firms may pursue 
diverse strategies for knowledge and skills sourcing including, among others, strategic 
partnerships with key institutions in order to influence the education and training of 
future researchers; research collaboration with individual academics or departments in 
universities in order to gain early access to research; or, finally, the creation of hybrid 
research organizations between firms and institutions allowing common research 
programs to be carried out. 
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Exhibit I. Computing variables 
 
(1) INFORMATION 
 
(1) In your opinion, your company finds product information available in the district or local area. 
(2) In your opinion, your company finds process information available in the district or local area. 
(3)  In your opinion, your company finds customer and market information available in the district or local area. 
(4) In your opinion, your company finds technology and innovation information available in the district or local area. 
(5) In your opinion, your company finds a network of information with local customers, suppliers and competitors. 
 
Use a 5-point Likert scale where 1= fully disagree and 5= fully agree 
 
 
(2) KNOW-HOW 
 
(1) In your opinion, in your company there are managers, technicians and employees with previous experience in 
district jobs 
(2) In your opinion, in your company managers, technicians and employees have a local origin. 
(3) In your opinion, in your company there is a common academic background and training by local academic 
institutions of the managers, technicians and employees. 
(4) In your opinion, in your company there is a relevant turnover of managers, technicians and employees. 
(5) In your opinion, there is a relevant degree of human resources mobility within the district. 
 
Use a 5-point Likert scale where 1= fully disagree and 5= fully agree 
 
(3) INSTITUTIONS 
 
(1) In your opinion, your company receives a relevant support in R&D activities by local institutions. 
(2) In your opinion, your company employees receive specific training by local institutions. 
(3) In your opinion, your company benefits from collective promotion of the district’s products and firms by local 
institutions. 
(4) In your opinion, your company receives flows of information and knowledge from local institutions. 
(5) In your opinion, the role of the local trade associations is very important and relevant for your company. 
 
Use a 5-point Likert scale where 1= fully disagree and 5= fully agree 
 
(4) SIZE 
 
(1) Total average sales for the period considered. 
 
 
(5) AGE 
 
(1) We used the year 2002 as a reference. 
 
 
(6) SATISFACTION 
 
(1) You find high quality, efficiency and effectiveness in the auxiliary industry. 
(2) You find a lot of natural resources and qualified and specialized human resources in your industry. 
(3) You find a high degree of coordination of the spatial environment through local institutions, and the availability 
and support of services to R&D activities. 
 
Use a 5-point Likert scale where 1= fully disagree and 5= fully agree 
 
(7) ROA 
 
(1) The earnings before interests and taxes divided by total assets. 
 
 
(8) GROWTH 
 
(1) Please indicate the comparative growth of your company regarding local competitors in terms of total revenues. 
 
Use a 5-point Likert scale where 1= much less and 5= much more 
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Table 1: Means, standard deviations and bivariate correlations for all variables 
Variables Mean S. D. α 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(1) INFORMATION 3.65 0.72 0.71        
(2) KNOW-HOW 3.66 0.45 0.60 0.169*       
(3) INSTITUTIONS 3.65 0.75 0.85 0.454*** 0.348***      
(4) SIZE 1446 1686 - 0.084 0.156 0.178*     
(5) AGE 25.30 12.80 - 0.023 0.322** -0.149 0.050    
(6) SATISFACTION 3.33 0.47 0.70 0.502*** 0.381*** 0.506*** 0.057 -0.033   
(7) ROA 0.12 0.07 - 0.289*** 0.235** 0.272*** 0.055 -0.051 0.331***  
(8) GROWTH 3.28 1.00 - 0.483*** -0.007 0.304*** -0.008 -0.104 0.077 0.083 
N=100 
Pearson’s correlation is significant at the levels: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
α= Alpha de Cronbach 
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Table 2: Logit Regression Results 
  Estimation (1) Estimation (2) 
Dependent  SATISFACTION GROWTH 
 Expected sign of 
the coefficent 
Coefficent 
(Statistic Wald) 
Coefficent 
(Statistic Wald) 
Constant  1.917*** 
(0.5499) 
-3.042 
(1.358) 
INFORMATION (+) 0.143** 
(0.054) 
0.473** 
(0.194) 
KNOW-HOW (+) -0.088 
(0.143) 
-0.042 
(0.408) 
INSTITUTIONS (+) 0.283*** 
(0.009) 
0.384*** 
(0.176) 
SIZE (+/-) -2.674E-08 
(0.000) 
-1.78E-08 
(0.000) 
AGE (-) 0.008 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.009) 
X2 of the model  29.958**** 27.486*** 
-2 Log Likelihood 
ratio 
 444.276 459.268 
N=100 
*p<0.10; **p<0.05;***p<0.01; and ****p<0.001. 
 
 Table 3: Regression results 
 Model (3) 
Dependent ROA (a) 
Constant -0.099 
(0.101) 
INFORMATION 0.033* 
(0.019) 
KNOW-HOW -0.015 
(0.023) 
INSTITUTIONS 0.047*** 
(0.018) 
SIZE -2.105E-09 
(0.000) 
AGE -1.519E-05 
(0.001) 
R2 0.217 
R2 Adjusted 0.128 
F Statistic 2.433** 
N=100 
*p<0.10; **p<0.05;***p<0.01; and  ****p<0.001. 
(a) Coefficients of regression not standardized (errors within brackets). 
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